![]() ![]() Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) systems provide an effective manner to protect sensitive data by hiding them on the device. Sensitive data protection is essential for mobile users. Experimental results show that MARVEL outperforms existing schemes by improving the control plane's request processing ability at least 27.3% while using 25% less processing time. In the online phase, MARVEL is deployed to make decisions on migrating switches. At the training phase, each agent learns how to migrate switches from the interaction with the network. MARVEL works in two phases: offline training and online decision making. In this paper, we propose a dynamic controller workload balancing scheme named MARVEL using an emerging machine learning technique named multi-agent reinforcement learning for the generation of switch migration actions. Most existing schemes rely heavily on iterative optimization algorithms to manipulate the mapping relationship between controllers and switches, which are either time-consuming or less satisfactory in terms of performance. Thus, some controllers may get overloaded and reject new requests, eventually reducing the control plane's request processing ability. Under the fluctuating network traffic, the static controller-switch mapping relationship could lead to imbalanced workload allocation. A large SDN usually implements its control plane with several distributed controllers, each controlling a subset of switches and synchronizes with other controllers to maintain a consistent network view. ![]() The control plane plays a significant role in the Software-Defined Networking (SDN). We analyzed TrueCrypt version 5.1a (latest available version during the writing of the pa- per) Truecrypt v6 introduces new features, including the ability to create deniable operating systems, which we have not studied. Finally, we suggest approaches for overcoming these challenges on modern operating systems like Windows. We hypothesize some extensions of our discoveries to regular (non-deniable) encrypted file systems. While staged in the context of TrueCrypt, our research high- lights several fundamental challenges to the creation and use of any DFS: even when the file system may be deni- able in the pure, mathematical sense, we find that the en- vironment surrounding that file system can undermine its deniability, as well as its contents. We find that the Windows Vista operating system itself, Microsoft Word, and Google Desktop all compromise the deniability of a TrueCrypt DFS. We examine the security requirements for creating a Deniable File System (DFS), and the efficacy with which the TrueCrypt disk-encryption software meets those re- quirements.
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